It has been argued by John Milbank and the Radical Orthodoxy sensibility that a genealogy can be traced directly from the univocity of being in scholastics such as Duns Scotus and William of Occam to modern atheism 1 . However, it can also be argued that such a genealogy can be traced from the equivocity of religious language amongst certain mystics to modern atheism. This link is clearly seen in the Vienna Circle for whom the 'nonsense' talk of mystics was a special object of attack and derision, prompting in part the reactionary turn towards an insistence on univocal language in an attempt to save meaning 2 ( a turn which ultimately ended in " As far as we are concerned, the distinction between the kind of metaphysics that is produced by a philosopher who has been duped by grammar, and the kind that is produced by a mystic who is trying to express the inexpressible, is of no great importance: what is important to us is to realize that even the utterances of the metaphysician who is attempting to expound a vision are literally senseless; so that henceforth we may pursue our philosophical research with as little regard for them as for the more inglorious kind of metaphysics which comes from a failure to understand the workings of our language. 
" As far as we are concerned, the distinction between the kind of metaphysics that is produced by a philosopher who has been duped by grammar, and the kind that is produced by a mystic who is trying to express the inexpressible, is of no great importance: what is important to us is to realize that even the utterances of the metaphysician who is attempting to expound a vision are literally senseless; so that henceforth we may pursue our philosophical research with as little regard for them as for the more inglorious kind of metaphysics which comes from a failure to understand the workings of our language.' 3 Antony Flew, 'Theology and Falsification' in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, edited by Alasdair MacIntyre and Anthony Flew (SCM Press, 1955) 4 Pseudo-Dionysius was pivotal in the transmission of Christian mysticism in the West, 4 especially in the 12 th to the 16th centuries through translations of his works into Latin by John Scotus Eriugena (9 th century). Indeed 'Denys' as he was popularly known, is the third most quoted author in the Thomistic corpus (after Augustine and Aristotle), named over 2000 times, of which 542 in the Summa Theologiae alone, showing his incontestable importance ( Roberto Busa SJ et al, Index Thomisticus, web edition by Eduardo Bernot et al) falls into a subtle nihilism, 19 by suggesting that in some sense the Without Being (i.e. the Nothing) 'is.' Cunningham coins the terms meontological, meontotheological or oukontotheological to describe Marion's position. 20 Nihilism could be literally translated as the identification of being with nothingness. Although Marion believes he has a predecessor for his 'God without being' in Anselm's 'that than which nothing greater can be conceived' 21 , Anselm clearly rejects a nihilistic interpretation of his theology in the Monologion: ' 'So then, to assert that this nature (without which no nature could exist) is nothing is as false as the claim that 'whatever is, is nothing' is absurd. Is it through nothing?
No, it is not, since it is completely unintelligible for something to exist through nothing.' 22 He could have more plausibly traced a genealogy of his position to Basilides, the Gnostic, who posited that a 'non-existent' God, who is synonymous with 'Nothing,' made the world out of 'non-existents.' 23 Deirdre Carabine categorises the system of Basilides as 'perhaps the first example of religious atheism.' 24 Furthermore, if it is true that being and intelligibility are coterminous, a presupposition central to Western philosophy from Parmenides 25 onwards 26 , then nihilism must be its opposite, the rupture of being and intelligibility. 27 Press, 1996) , p.35 26 E.g. Aquinas, 'Now everything, in as far as it has being, so far is it knowable.' ST 1a, q. 16, a. 3, resp 27 'The alternative to the principle that to be is to be intelligible, is the nihilism which afflicts so much contemporary thought and culture. For if being is not what is comprehended by thought, then thought does not apprehend being. This in effect means that there is no being, since whatever we call "being" is not being, but a projection, interpretation, illusion -in short, nothing. If reality is not as thought must apprehend it, then there is no such thing as reality. Conversely, if thought is not the apprehension of being, then all thought, in that it apprehends being, is illusory. Nihilism may indeed be said to consist most fundamentally in the denial of the The 'speculative theology' which Marion advocates is unashamedly 'opposed to the identification of being with thought' 28 -not merely, it should be noted, the identification of being with human thought, which would be the hallmark of rationalism, but the rejection of the identification of being with thought per se rendering reality literally Mindless and ultimately unknowable in itself.
The seeds are already there in Heidegger and Levinas. Heidegger's rejection of both the law of non-contradiction and the correspondence account of truth is directly based on his presupposition that the intellect is 'dependent on the nothing'. 29 Rejection of the law of non-contradiction is a hallmark of nihilism since if the law of non-contradiction does not obtain then it would make it possible for something to both 'be' and 'not be' at the same time and in the same way. is 'wholly' Other there can be no 'face' nor 'neighbour', except by equivocation.
Levinas is not (wholly) unaware of the tension in his position: ' To conceive this otherwise than being requires, perhaps, as much audacity as scepticism shows, when it does not hesitate to affirm the impossibility of statement while venturing to realise this impossibility by the very statement of the impossibility.' 35 This antinomy can only be overcome by allowing at least a 'trace' of the invisible. 36 Marion inherits the internal difficulties apparent in both Levinas' thought and Heidegger's and amplifies them. In a revealing footnote of In Excess, we find Marion interpreting the hyperousios of Pseudo-Dionysius in wholly negative terms as a rejection of supereminence. Marion cites Francis Bertin, the French translator of Eriugena's De Divisione Naturae in a section treating the discussion of the superlative names of God in Dionysius to back up his own view that hyperousios is a radical denial of the etre of God:
' …the prefixes super or more than in no way imply a way of eminence which surreptitiously reintroduces affirmations at the heart of the negations. When one says that God is Superessence, one does not at all suggest that God is an essence situated at the apex of the hierarchy of essences, but rather that God is essentially
void.(my italics).' 37
In seeking to preserve the transcendence of God, in this passage at least, Marion instead appears to reduce him to nothing. This would be consistent with Marion's debt to Heidegger, since a close comparison of the two writers suggests that Marion has simply substituted the placeholder 'God Without Being' for Heidegger's 'Nothing'. 38 It is not surprising then that since God is a Void for Marion, the 'withdrawal' of God is 'the ultimate figure of revelation.' 39 The Void is silent and must be honoured with silence, a silence which 'exposes itself to an infinite equivocation of meaning.' 40 We have already traced a connection with Gnosticism in Marion's God without being, now a silent deity also recollects the followers of Simon Magus who taught that the universe arose from Unfathomable Silence. 41 But it is not at all clear that this is the correct way even to understand Eriugena 42 , let alone the Dionysius he allegedly speaks for, since in the context to which Bertin refers, Eriugena has been saying that no predication can be made of God for which there is an opposite. But on this logic 'Void' does have an opposite (i.e. 'Being') and therefore it follows that the appellation God is essentially void must also be denied! 43
In other words 'Void' cannot be an affirmation of what God is. Although it is true for Eriugena (as for Dionysius) that God is no thing ('nothing' in that sense), a rejection of ontotheology, it does not follow from this that God is a Void, or an empty blank.
Eriugena explains in Book 2 of the Periphyseon:
'How, therefore, can the Divine Nature understand of itself what it is, seeing that it is nothing? For it surpasses everything that is, since it is not even being but all being derives from it, and by virtue of its eminence it is supereminent over all essence and 
Critique.
Dionysius does not, it seems to us, speak of God without being (as Derrida is also quick to point out). To the contrary, he informs his readers in one passage of the Divine Names: 'We might say that He is not lacking in being,' 45 (though the qualifier 'we might say' is reminiscent of the apophatic move earlier made by Plotinus). He explains quite explicitly that the via negativa is 'contrary to the usual sense of deprivation.' 46 Whereas Marion implies that hyperousios is equivalent to non-being, Dionysius says the exact opposite, that 'non-being is really an excess of being.' 47 How, for instance, could a God who is void of being, i.e. having a privation of being, exercise power over the heavenly bodies by miracle which Dionysius affirms, against O'Rourke notes, even Plato's philosophy, in spite of the priority given to the Good, 'is in intention, I suggest, first and foremost a philosophy of being,' (i.e. some sense of 'Realness,' 52 while lacking the conceptual tools to fully articulate it. 53 Indeed Plato can even on occasions refer to the Good as 'the brightest' 54 and 'the most blessed part of being.' The  is therefore in the Platonic tradition not something non-existent, but the Truly Real. 55 If God, for Dionysius, is 'without being' (Marion) it can only be in the sense of negating the negation, that is to say, denying the binary opposition between being and non-being. In 'repelling being, it struggles to find rest' not in the Void but in the Good 'which transcends all being.' 56
Hyperousios as 'Superbeing' (Jacques Derrida)
Jacques Derrida in his critique of negative theology goes to the opposite end of the spectrum in his reading of Dionysius than that of Marion, arguing that the term ',' cannot avoid smuggling in a kind of Superbeing hidden behind beings. 57 On this reading God must inevitably remain on the same ontological level as those celestial beings which are similarly described by the prefix in the term ('supercelestial') in Divine Names 1.4, which are beings not by privation, 
Hyperousios as Unlimited Being: Aquinas' reading (and transformation) of

Pseudo-Dionysius
In turning to Aquinas' reception of Dionysius we see that he is far more in touch with this Neoplatonic mindset than either Marion or Derrida and therefore more faithful than either to the author's original intent, while at the same time subtly transforming him in line with Catholic orthodoxy. In Summa Theologiae 1a, q.12, a.1 for example, Aquinas comments on the previously discussed passage in Divine Names 1.4 and agrees with the Areopagite that God does not exist in the same way that creatures exist::
'God is not something existing; but he is rather super-existence, as Dionysius says (Div Nom iv). Therefore God is not intelligible; but above all intellect.' 68 However, Thomas' reading of Dionysius differs from that of both Derrida and 
Aquinas recognises in Dionysian theology a real ontological difference between
Creator and creatures which prohibits any talk of a 'Superbeing' by univocal predication. The objection, that God is 'not something existing' is understood to distinguish God from existing things and therefore to mean that He exists above all things. 75 God is 'non-existing' not by a lack of something possessed by creatures, but by excess, 76 He has a different mode of being altogether on account of Divine simplicity. On Thomas' understanding God uniquely is his own existence, which can never be true of creatures, since it is impossible for there to be more than one selfsubsisting existence. 77 Thomas agrees with Denys on the rather obvious point that God is beyond human concepts. 78 However, Aquinas denies that this is so because God is 'beyond being' (esse) itself. 'The Platonici' had allowed the predicate 'being' ( Latin ens or Greek ) only to describe creatures and not the Good or the One. 79 Part of the reason for this was that they regarded prime matter under the category of 'non-being,' that is to say, a potentiality that could not be called 'existing', yet remained in relationship to the Good as its completed actuality. 'All things desire the Good', Aristotle had concluded. Therefore the Good (and the One) was conceived as a more universal and other things with goodness. ' In the passage he is commenting on The Divine Names 5, in which Dionysius had been praising God:
'He is not a facet of being. Rather, being is a facet of him. He is not contained in being, but being is contained in him. He does not possess being, but being possesses him. He is the eternity of being, the source and the measure of being.' (824A tr. Luibheid).
First let us note that this passage again does not support Marion's reading that God is without being in terms of a Void. In this chapter Dionysius treats 'Being' as one of the names by which God can be appropriately praised. He shows that God is the Measure of all things, including being. God is identified with being, while at the same time transcending it, since being processes from him into all beings. In creatures existence is always received in something, but for the Creator existence is unparticipated. 85 The phrase translated 'being possesses him' 86 in the text quoted above is confusing, since it could imply that being precedes God and God participates in him which would be the precise opposite of the context. Therefore S. ' common esse is in Godself as contained in a container and conversely God is not in that which is esse. Third in that all other existents participate that which is esse, but not God; rather created esse itself is a certain participation of God and God's similitude; and this is what he says, that common esse has God, namely God as participating God's similitude, but God does not have esse as if participating esse itself. And from this it is clear that Godself is the eternity of created esse itself, i.e. it's duration, (this is the notion of duration), and God is also its principle and measure..' 90 According to Aquinas, God exceeds common being (ens) and common being participates him. Since common being proceeds from God as its Cause it is proper to name God 'Being' (esse) itself. Nor can esse be a void, since it is productive of all things, their final cause and the cause of all form and all life. Aquinas cites the eleventh chapter of The Divine Names saying, "For we do not say that a certain divine or angelic substance is through itself the esse which is the cause that all things are; for only the super-substantial being itself (namely of the highest God) is the principle and substance and cause that all things are by nature" -a principle which is indeed productive, a substance in the manner of an exemplary form and a cause which is final. And he adds: "Nor do we say that there is any other deity that generates life besides the super-divine life which is the What is the primary name of God?
Pseudo-Dionysius had insisted that God in himself is beyond every name, 92 whilst preferring to use the name 'One' or the name 'Good,' (which is honoured as 'the highest name' in his work The Divine Names.) 93 The 'Good' signifies for Dionysius 
Being Without Limit (Aquinas)
Speaking in an absolute sense, Qui est is the more appropriate primary Name because it is the most universal and indeterminate. In Augustine's words: 'non Aquinas, goodness is not a name above being but because of God's simplicity, is convertible with being. This is therefore how he understands Dionysius:
'And this truth, Dionysius most expressly teaches in the fifth chapter of On the Divine Names, when he says that Sacred Scripture "... does not say that to be good is one thing and to be a being is another and that life or wisdom is something else, nor that there are many causes and lesser productive deities of whom some extended to some things and others to others." In this statement he removes the opinion of the Platonists who posited that the very essence of goodness was the highest God, under Whom there was another god who is being itself.' 104 To sum up the difference with Marion, for Aquinas God is without ens, but He is not without esse (French etre).
Being and analogy
In contrast to what we have seen is Marion's hermeneutic, Aquinas' God-talk is therefore neither anti-realist nor is it nominalist. Creatures in a sense 'borrow' their ' "Being," (ens) however, is called that which finitely participates "to be" (esse). And it is this which is proportioned to our intellect, whose object is some 'that which is'…' 109
To make this distinction explicit, Thomas uses the term 'common being' to refer to created being and 'Self-Subsistent Being' to refer to Uncreated being. Therefore Aquinas transposes the Dionysian language of God as 'beyond all being' into the mode of 'beyond all existing things.' 110 In the same chapter of his Commentary on the Book of Causes, Aquinas agrees with the unknown author who argued that unparticipated being (amethectum) cannot be directly known since there is nothing higher to which it can be referred and understood by (Aquinas reads amethectum as literally 'not existing after' i.e. there is nothing before it in the chain of being). It can however be indirectly known through those beings which participate it. Therefore the intellect can known beings (ens) but it cannot know Being itself (esse) except indirectly through beings. 111 Aquinas claims to be getting to the heart of what Dionysius really means, but is his hermeneutic a plausible one or is it or is it a significant departure, albeit in a different direction to Marion 117 This is supported by the fact that, in sharp contrast to those Platonici criticised by Aquinas 118 , Dionysius explicitly does deploy the name, ' ' 'The God Who Is,' taken from Exodus 3.14, that is, the One who 'is Being for whatever is,' 119 Theology is right, insists Denys, in ascribing this name of Being 'to him who truly is,' 120 as long as this is not understood in an anthropomorphic or ontotheological way: 'God is not some kind of being'; rather He is the One who 'gives being to everything else' ( 121 'So therefore God as originator of everything through the first of all his gifts is praised as "He who is. " ' 122 But what is the relationship between the donation and the donor? Is the name 'being' given only extrinsically to the effect or does it also apply intrinsically to the Cause? Unlike Aquinas, Dionysius appears to have no concept of names which are true of God properly or intrinsically. 123 God is not identical to Being in se; Being is rather the first of God's created perfections, (albeit the primary perfection in which all others participate) which is then named equivocally of its transcendent Cause who is in Himself 'Beyond Being' on the mystical ascent back to God. This is why he writes in The Divine Names:
'But I must point out that the purpose of what I have to say is not to reveal that being in its transcendence, for this is something beyond words, something unknown, something above unity itself. What I wish to do is to sing a hymn of praise for the being-making procession of the absolute divine Source of being into the total domain of being. Himself too, so that the Trinity is to be understood as "immanent" and not just "economic." "God, the Revealer, is identical with His act in revelation and also identical with its effect." 133 Hence:
"Revelation in the Bible is not a minus; it is not another over against God. It is the same, the repetition of God. Revelation is indeed God's predicate, but in such a way that this predicate is in every way identical with God Himself." 134 The Byzantine understanding is weakened if we take into account a greater continuity between Pseudo-Dionysius and the neo-Platonic heritage from Plotinus/Proclus in the principle that omne agens agit sibi simile. This principle is explicit in Aquinas' mature work, De Substantiis Separatis.
'Furthermore, just as the cause is in a manner present in its effect through a participated likeness of itself, so, every effect is in its cause in a more excellent way according to the power of the cause. Therefore all things must exist more eminently in their First Cause, which is God, than in themselves.' 135 On the basis of this neoplatonic principle we can agree then with Eric Perl and regard these 'processions,' not as lacking real revelation but as theophanies of the One as it appears in its multiplicity. 136 Rosemann is also helpful on this point:
'Although all that is actually accessible to us in the present world are the effects of agent forces (and of the Agent Force), and not the agent forces themselves, the law of similarity guarantees that these effects are possessed of a real revelatory Firstly, Aquinas points out that on Maimonides' account all divine predication would be equally metaphorical: God is wise in the same way that he is angry or in the same way that he is 'fire' since all of these only describe God's effects rather than God Himself. However, this is not how the saints and fathers have described God within the tradition, since they have denied that God is a body subject to passions, but they have affirmed perfection terms like 'life', 'wisdom' and 'being.' If we were to follow Maimonides consistently then all expressions drawn from creatures would be equally true or false. In fact, Aquinas argues, God is named Goodness and Life, not merely as cause of creaturely goodness and life but intrinsically by the way of supereminence.
Secondly Aquinas argues that if the world is not eternal in the past (which is the Catholic faith) then these effects are not eternal and therefore before the world 138 De Veritate 2.11.122-34 cited in Gregory P Rocca, Speaking the Incomprehensible God (Catholic University of America Press, 2004), p.179. 139 De Potentia, q.7, a.5; see also ST 1a, q.13, a.5; 140 De Potentia q.7, a.5, resp http://dhspriory.org/thomas/QDdePotentia7.htm#7:5 began it would not be proper to name God as Word, Life, Being, Goodness etc.. He only became these when he started to act temporally ( a reductio ad absurdum).
Thirdly, it is insufficient to speak of God only negatively since all negatives assume a positive in order to make the judgment that certain properties are excluded from him. It would be impossible even to deny anything of God unless we could also affirm something of him. On this point Aquinas appeals to Dionysius in Divine Names chapter 13 which he reads as saying that names are given truly of God albeit imperfectly.
'..(N)umber has its own share of being. But the transcendent unity defines the one itself and every number. For it is the source, and the cause, the number and the order of the one, of number, and of all being. And the fact that the transcendent Godhead is one and triune must not be understood in any of our typical senses. No.
There is the transcendent unity of God and the fruitfulness of God, and as we prepare to sing this truth we use the names Trinity and Unity for that which is in fact beyond every name, calling it the transcendent being above every being. But no unity or trinity, no number or oneness, no fruitfulness, indeed, nothing that is or is known can proclaim that hiddenness beyond every mind and reason of the transcendent Godhead which transcends every being.' 141 On Aquinas' reading, then, Dionysius can be acquitted from being charged as a nontrinitarian, 142 since although God is beyond the imperfect language of Father, Son and Spirit which are drawn from creatures, this must at the same time mean that he is beyond the creaturely understanding of a distinctionless One! Rowan Williams concurs:
141 DN 13.3. 980C-981A 142 This accusation was made by F.C. Copleston in A History of Philosophy that the Dionysian teaching that all concepts including number, divinity, goodness, wisdom, eternity or time, sonship and fatherhood must be denied of God, implies a hidden 'One' (albeit a non-numerical One!) lying behind the differentiation of Persons in the Trinity, which suggests a form of Sabellianism. In this theology. There is no immanent trinity but only a distinctionless God behind a wholly economic trinity which seems to be the direction developed by Eckhart (1260-1327). ' We believe that the divine nature is indeterminate and uncircumscribed, so we do not think of its comprehension, but we define that the nature be thought of in every way as infinity. The infinite usually is not defined by anything or by anyone, but according to every argument infinity escapes limits. Therefore that which is beyond limit is not at all defined by a name. Thus in reference to the divine nature, in order that the intent of the indeterminate might remain, we say that the divine is above every name, and one of the names is deity. Therefore the same thing is not able to be a name and to be thought to be above every name." Gregory of Nyssa: 'Concerning we should think of saying there are not three Gods, to Ablabius' inclinations of pious minds may have something to say concerning that which is ineffable and incomprehensible..' 148
Implications for epistemology
The debate on whether God is without being, beyond being or rather is Unlimited being has crucial implications for epistemology which we will seek to address in this final section. If being and truth are convertible, as Aquinas argues in Summa Theologiae question 16, then everything is knowable only in so far as it has being. 149 But, if, as Pseudo-Dionysius claims, God is 'beyond being,' it seems to follow that he cannot be known.
'If all knowledge is of that which is and is limited to the realm of the existent, then whatever transcends being must also transcend knowledge.' 150 Therefore God must be 'the Super-unknowable,' 151 who can be reached only through a paradoxical ascent of 'unknowing' (αγνωσια). 152 But Aquinas does not follow this reasoning to total agnosticism which is the prima facie Dionysian conclusion:
'God exists above all that exists; inasmuch as he is his own existence. by the capacity of the creature to receive it, 156 just as the dazzling light of the sun is limited by the vision of the bat. 157 Rosemann explains that: ' The object proportionate to the human intellect is being (ens), which participates in a finite manner in Being (esse), mediating it in and through the world of essences or 'quiddities'. 158 From this perspective, God as Ipsum Esse Subsistens is both a hindrance to, but also the basis for knowledge of God. God is 'Supremely Knowable' precisely because He is Being, analogically speaking. He is therefore supremely knowable to himself above intellect and known imperfectly to the human intellect through his effect in participated beings 159 omne agens agit sibi simile.
Being and Logic
This is consistent with Aristotle's principle that logic itself is based on being. 160 It is on the foundation of 'being' that the first operation of the intellect is a knowledge of quiddities and the second operation is a forming of judgements. 161 Commenting on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Aquinas writes:
'..the first indemonstrable principle is that 'the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time,' which is based on the notion of 'being' and 'not-being': and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in Metaph. iv, text. 9.' 162 Lest we misunderstand him, in referring to the Law of non-contradiction as 'most certain', Aristotle did not intend to cast any doubt on the principle, as if to say it is the 'most certain' of a class of relatively doubtful principles. To the contrary, Aristotle goes on to assert that the Law of non-contradiction is a 'necessary' truth, whose denial is 'impossible'. Though of course it is possible for people to 'say' that the same thing both 'is' and 'is not', it is impossible for people to actually believe this since it cannot be said truly. 163 Following Kant 164 , the status of this 'most certain' of all first principles has been fiercely contested, 165 especially in regards to whether or not it is a metaphysical principle (applying to 'things in themselves') or simply a linguistic one. 166 For Aristotle, the answer is clear:
'Our present question is not whether it is possible for the same thing to be and not to be in regard to the locution, but whether it is possible in regard to the object.' 167 It is not within the scope of this paper to discuss this question in depth, except in relation to Thomas' position. Lest we be misled into the view that Aquinas is only describing Aristotle's thought about first principles and bracketting out his own position in the commentaries on the Aristotelian texts 168 , we can be left in no doubt from the bold language used in the unambiguously 'Neoplatonic' commentary, In de divinis nominibus, contained in a passage which treats the nature of discursive knowledge. Here, Aquinas argues that even though the soul is engaged in a circular process of knowledge from sense evidence back to itself, where it is 'rolled up' according to its intellectual powers, this circularity does not result in scepticism, since:
'all that ratiocination is judged through resolution to first principles in which error does not occur and by which the soul is defended against error. ' 169 This position that the first principles of knowledge are infallible and thus the foundation of true knowledge is confirmed in two parallel readings. The first is from the Aristotelian commentary In Peri Hermeneais:
'Perfect knowledge requires certitude, and this is why we cannot be said to know unless we know what cannot be otherwise.' 170 The second is from Aquinas' mature work On Separate Substances where in a discussion on deception in intellectual creatures he declares:
'accordingly, concerning those things which we grasp properly by our intellect as well as concerning the first principles, no one can be deceived.' 171 It might be countered that since being is named from the first object (ens) conceived by the intellect, 172 it can never be adequately applied to God in Himself 173 :
If God is 'beyond being' then it seems the law of non-contradiction would not apply to Him. 174 'the divine unity is beyond being…the indivisible Trinity holds within a shared undifferentiated unity……..the assertion of all things, the denial of all things, that which is beyond every assertion and denial.' 175 On the face of it, this conflicts with Aristotle's logic that 'Affirmation and denial cannot be simultaneously true,' 176 (the law of non-contradiction) or that 'Contradiction is an opposition which by its very nature allows no middle ground (the law of excluded middle). ' 177 Nevertheless, Aquinas remains committed to Aristotle's formulation of the law of non-contradiction as is clear from his Quaestiones Disputatae de Potentia where he discusses the question of what is possible for God. He agrees that in every contradiction is included a simultaneous affirmation and negation, which is impossible, since it cannot apply to the nature of a being that it both 'is' and 'is not'.
Even God cannot cause what is impossible in this sense since:
'he is the greatest actuality and the chief being. And so his action can only be terminated chiefly in being, and in non-being consequentially. And so he cannot cause affirmation and negation to be simultaneously true, or any things in which this kind of impossibility is included. ' 178 In summary, Aquinas is emphatic that 'it is in my opinion false' 179 to say that God can do the self-contradictory. But Aquinas at the same time acquits the Areopagite of teaching the existence of true contradictions by distinguishing the res significata, from the modus significandi. 180 He reads Denys as saying, not that God is beyond assertions and denials, but that both assertions and denials can be made in different respects. 181 That is why Thomas deliberately chooses Eriugena's translation of Celestial Hierarchy 2.3 over Sarracen's. Affirmations about God are 'incongruous' (Eriugena: incompactae) but not 'inappropriate' (Sarracen: inconvenientes). 182 God is affirmed as literally Being as far as the Subject signified is concerned but the way of expressing it (modus significandi) is necessarily defective (or 'incongruous'), and therefore must be 'denied.' A related distinction made by Aquinas is that between the a quo and the ad quod of language. 183 The a quo of language is the modus significandi ; we speak by means of God's created effects. Therefore our language is not directly ad quod. We saw how at the beginning of this paper, Marion has drawn attention to the negative aspect of the ad quod but neglected the positive value of the a quo. 184 But for Aquinas this is not only true of God's essence but of all essences. Nothing, not even a fly, is known in its full quiddity. 185 This concealedness of revelation is an insight which has been more recently confirmed through the method of phenomenology 186 - we do not see the 'thing in itself', however this does not lead to scepticism since we still truly see the 'thing in itself' via its effects. The a quo signification is 'some sensible impression which the thing to be named has made upon the naming subject.' 187 Aquinas gives the (false) etymology of lapis (stone) as that which hurts the foot (pedem) when it is kicked. 188 Here the ad quod of the stone is not fully revealed in the a quo of its origin of predication. This then would be how Aquinas would receive the Dionysian 'processions:' 'So we must say that these kinds of divine names are imposed from the divine processions; for as according to the diverse processions of their perfections, creatures are the representations of God, although in an imperfect manner. so likewise our intellect knows and names God according to each kind of procession; but nevertheless these names are not imposed to signify the procession themselves, as if when we say "God lives," the sense were, "life proceeds from Him"; but to signify the principle itself of things, in so far as life pre-exists in Him, although it preexists in Him in a more eminent way than can be understood or signified.' 189 As ipsum esse subsistens, God is not 'beyond Being,' in respect of the ad quod or res significata because God does not lack any perfection. He is rather Being Unlimited and pre-eminently. In this Thomistic account of theological predication, 'Being' becomes a term which has priority (per prius) for God in Himself yet can be applied analogically but with sufficient unity to creatures (contra Scotus who believed this was only possible of univocal predication). 190 This solution plausibly maintains the validity of the law of non-contradiction and thus preserves meaningful predication about God. 'Truth' itself is analogical in that its primary sense (ratio propria) 191 refers to God who is truth; but secondarily refers to the human intellect which participates in Truth. 192 but not corresponding to God Himself. 195 To the contrary, as Rosemann puts it ..' human language is not condemned to utter vanity. It aims at something which it is consistent with the theory that the real Pseudo-Dionysius was Sergius of Reshaina who wrote works commending Aristotelian logic. 205 Dionysius affirms Aristotelian logic for example in Ecclesiastical Hierarchy 2.5: 'However, it is not possible to participate in wholly opposed things at one and the same time, nor is it possible for one who has had a certain communion with the One to lead a divided life as long as he holds on to participation in the one.' 206 These texts could be utilised to vindicate Aquinas' apparent gloss of 'agnostic' statements in Dionysius, or they could highlight impossible tensions within the Dionysian system and its modern counterparts. Dionysius can only deny the language of being by using the language of being, which silently witnesses to the superiority of Aquinas' metaphysics of Absolute Being. Aquinas' commentary on the Divine Names is illuminating on this point:
'And he says that, since God is truth itself, for God to deny himself is nothing other than for God to fall away from the truth. But since the true is the same as being, it follows that to fall completely away from truth is to fall completely away from being.
Therefore, what he says -that God cannot deny himself -is the same as if he were to say: God is not able to fall short of being. But this "not to fall short of being" is the same as if he were to say that God is not non-being; by which is meant rather being itself [or that he himself is]. Just as if it should be said that God is not able to be unable, this does not show that he is powerless, but that he is supremely powerful; and similarly, if it should be said that he does not know that he does not know, and therefore that he has privation of knowledge, this is the very having of perfect knowledge [or that he has perfect knowledge]. Through this, therefore, that God cannot deny himself, nothing is detracted from his power by the impossible, but it is the same as if it were said that God cannot not be true and being and powerful.' ('that simplicity where contradictories coincide'). 210 It is significant that Aquinas resisted this Eastern drift by insisting that all names of God are not ultimately synonymous but predicate him substantially though imperfectly. 211 Aquinas was also emphatic that 'it is in my opinion false' 212 to say that God can do the selfcontradictory. But a fully Trinitarian interpretation of Divine Simplicity seems somewhat weak even in Aquinas i.e. a unity with genuine distinction and Otherness which may have contributed to the monist drift of his successors.
The principle of non-contradiction receives surer theological moorings in Aquinas' metaphysics of Being than in Denys primacy of the Good. It is grounded upon the Primary Name of God, He Who Is, 213 by which He cannot not Be. This applies to God properly and to creatures by participation. 214 Similarly, the law of identity, which depends on the law of non-contradiction, 215 can be seen from a theological perspective as the creaturely analogue of the Tetragrammaton, 'I AM THAT I AM.' (Exodus 3:14) . Avoiding being pierced with either of Euthyphro's horns, Aquinas shows that the law of identity and the law of non-contradiction are identical with God's own integrity or faithfulness. 216 God cannot deny Himself and therefore it follows that the laws of logic are necessary truths within the Divine mind. 217 This preserves rational discourse about God also for Aquinas and explains why there is no final conflict between the truths of faith and the truths of reason. 218 The separation of beings from Being in the ontological difference need not entail, as with Marion, an absence of Being and the solution for this need not be the reversion to God as a Superbeing. Rather a recovery of the understanding of God as Unlimited Being known through his effects via the law of similarity (omne agens agit sibi simile) preserves the validity of logic, epistemology and meaningful language about God. To borrow O'Rourke's elegant image: 'Being is the cradle of all meaning and from it emerges the intelligibility of all subsequent objects of thought.' 219 
